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“Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants.” 
This article deals with issues of transparency applicable to grant-making 
foundations in Switzerland and analyzes the legal regime in this regard. This analysis 
is contextualized by functional aspects typically affecting the performance of 
foundations. 
The article concludes that the Swiss regime is minimalist and that it might not 
be sufficient in terms of setting standards on transparency. However, we identify 
positive developments in the self-governing rules included in the Swiss Foundation 
Code (SFC). This Code provides a very effective complementary tool. It constitutes a 
laudable effort on the part of Switzerland’s philanthropic sector to reinforce self-
regulation by setting transparency standards. 
 
Introduction 
Transparency is a contested issue in the regulation of grant-making foundations. In 
principle, one might argue that transparency should be the norm under which foundations 
operate. After all, grant-making foundations are institutions established by and for civil 
society. Therefore, by definition, foundations themselves ought to be interested in opening 
access to the flow and democratization of information within the philanthropic sector.1 Yet 
vehement criticism has been voiced against foundations owing to their lack of compliance 
with transparency rules, managerial omissions, and their tax-exempt status—failings 
perceived by many critics as unjustifiable privileges.2 But at the same time, one must be 
cautious in dispensing criticism3 so as to avoid false conclusions and unwarranted 
generalizations.4  
                                                          
* Lucas R. Arrivillaga is a lawyer and a research associate at the Centre for Philanthropy Studies 
(CEPS) at the University of Basel, Switzerland. Georg von Schnurbein is professor for foundation management 
at the Faculty of Economics and director of the Centre for Philanthropy Studies (CEPS) at the University of 
Basel, Switzerland. 
1 Third sector institutions engage civil society in their activities, such as advocacy, charitable assistance, 
higher education, health care, arts performance, residential nursing, and religious ceremonies. Steinberg, R. & 
Powell, W., Introduction, in The Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook, 2nd ed. (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2006), pp. 1-9. 
2 Indeed, non-profit and tax-exempt status do not entail a withdrawal from economic activity. Posner, R. 
and Philipson, T., “Antitrust in the Non-Profit Sector,” NBER Working Paper Series, March 2006, p. 2.  
3 Foundations, as legally tax-exempt institutions, have often been under threat for financial or political 
reasons. Hammack, D., “American Debates on the Legitimacy of Foundations,” in The Legitimacy of 
Philanthropic Foundations: United States and European Perspective, Prewitt, K., Dogan, M., Heydemann, S., & 
Toepler, S. (eds.) (Russell Sage Foundation, 2006), p. 49. 
4 Examples of well-established organizations in the third sector are the Red Cross and the Salvation 
Army. Although they might be considered standard organizations for this sector, they operate under very 
different strategic management principles from most other institutions in this sector. Hansmann, H., “The 
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The need to formulate a legal regime5 aimed at increasing transparency across the 
third sector is now seen as essential, not only by the government but also by these institutions 
themselves.6 In this article, we focus on the legal regime of Switzerland.  
In order to contextualize the rest of the article, we shall outline some preliminary 
assumptions: (a) The revolution in digital technology is constantly diminishing the distance 
between institutions, both private and public, and the community. (b) There has been an 
increase in the amount of self-regulation undertaken, in the number of legislative reforms 
issued, and in the scholarships awarded, all of which are aimed at improving transparency in 
grant-making foundations’ managerial activities. This might indicate a greater need to adopt 
standards within this sector.7 (c) The Civil Code reform8 does not appear to have satisfactorily 
addressed transparency issues. (d) The Swiss philanthropic sector has autonomously adopted 
newer and stricter rules on transparency standards with its introduction of the Swiss 
Foundation Code (SFC).9  
The article is structured in four parts. Part I provides a picture of the Swiss grant-
making foundation today. Part II categorizes the elements, tools, and limits of the grant-
making foundations. Part III deals with the issue of transparency and its limits from different 
functional and socio-political angles: technological limits, limits of international legislation, 
limits imposed by the internal legal structure of foundations, limits defined by the legislation 
on gift-giving, and functional limits to the implementation of transparency standards. Part IV 
comments on Swiss legislation relevant to foundations and relates these points to the 
provisions in the Swiss Foundations Code.  
I. The Swiss NPS and Foundations at a Glance 
Given the size of the country and its population, Switzerland has a large nonprofit 
sector. Some 90,000 nonprofit organizations exist, accounting for 4.7 percent of GDP. When 
the value of volunteering work is included, this figure rises to 6 percent of the GDP.10 
The foundation sector in particular plays a unique role. By contrast to the Anglo-
American definition, a foundation in the Swiss legal context can be a grant-making, an 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from Corporate Income Taxation,” Yale Law Journal, Vol. 91: 
54 (1981), p. 65. 
5 The legal regime applied to foundations is complex and often diversified. Grant-making foundations 
normally straddle different branches of the law: Private Law and Public Law; Federal Law and Local (Cantonal) 
Law; Tax Law; Canon Law; Constitutional Law. Dr. Peter Lex, “Die Grundzüge des Stiftungsrechts,” in 
Stiftungen in Theorie, Recht und Praxis: Handbuch für ein Modernes Stiftungswesen, Graf Strachwitz, R., & 
Mercker, F. (eds.) (Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 2005), pp. 205-209.  
6 To assess the relevance of the discussions on the operation and management of grant-making 
foundations in this regard, see, for example, “Public Policy for Nonprofits: A Report on ARNOVA’s 
Symposium of October 2010,” 
https://netforum.avectra.com/eWeb/DynamicPage.aspx?Site=ARNOVA&WebCode=symposium. 
7 In 2011, the European Foundation Centre (EFC) issued the report Exploring Transparency and 
Accountability Regulation of Public-Benefit Foundations in Europe (2011).  
8 The Swiss Civil Code was reformed in 2007. The issue has become more relevant, since it is expected 
that new tax-estate reforms are likely to introduce more changes to the sector, increasing the amount of capital 
channeled to foundations annually. See Breitschmid P., “Sale”: Schlussverkauf für die Erbschaftssteuer (NZZ-
23.11.11).  
9 Numerous codes of conduct issued by European countries for the third sector deal expressly with the 
issue of transparency. See EFC, Exploring Transparency.  
10 Cf. Helmig, B., Gmür, M., Bärlocher, Ch., & Bächthold, St., “Statistik des Dritten Sektors in der 
Schweiz,” in Helmig, B., Lichtsteiner, H., & Gmür, M. (eds.), Der Dritte Sektor der Schweiz (Bern, 2010), p. 
174. 
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operating, or an organizing institution. Of the 12,715 charitable foundations in total, two-
thirds are grant-making.11 
Over the past twenty years, more than half of charitable foundations have been less 
than ten years old, and total foundation assets have risen from CHF 30 billion (USD 32 
billion) to CHF 70 billion (USD 75 billion). As a consequence of this enormous growth, 
public interest in the foundation sector is increasing.12 
Besides the statistical increase, the foundation sector has been subject to changes in 
managerial and structural organization.13 Two associations that serve foundations currently 
exist, covering activities such as lobbying, convening, and publications. In terms of 
management, the Swiss Foundation Code has gained international attention; it is the first 
foundation governance code in Europe.14  
II. Location, Tools, and the Bottom-Line Foundations Today 
In a civil law system such as the Swiss regime, a foundation is normally defined as 
legal entity established by the endowment of assets for a specified purpose.15 In theory, this 
purpose must be one of public interest. Besides the fundamental civil-law requirement that the 
founder has an autonomous will (i.e., possesses legal capacity), a foundation’s constitution 
contains two formation requirements: the endowment, as the material element; and the 
purpose, as the subjective element. The endowment is what distinguishes a foundation from 
other institutions within the non-for-profit sector16 (or civil society17), such as associations 
and advocacy groups.18  
Thus, foundations belong to an economic sector that emerges independently of 
markets and states. But the tools of this sector differ considerably from the resources available 
to the other sectors. While governments generate their incomes by exacting taxes (compulsory 
payments), and markets generate their incomes by creating financial surpluses (profits), 
foundations are not directed at generating income. The structure of society itself is a 
consequence of government, as there would be no civil order without centralized power, and 
                                                          
11 Cf. Purtschert, R., von Schnurbein, G., & Beccarelli, C., “Switzerland,” in Anheier, H.K., & Daly, S. 
(eds.), The Politics of Foundations (London, 2007), p. 310. 
12 Cf. Eckhardt, B., Jakob, D., & von Schnurbein, G., Der Schweizer Stiftungsreport (Basel, 2012). 
13 Von Schnurbein, G., & Timmer, K., Die Förderstiftung (Basel, 2010). 
14 Sprecher, Th., Egger, Ph., & Janssen, M. (eds.), Swiss Foundation Code 2009: Principles and 
Recommendations for the Establishment and Management of Grant-Making Foundations (Basel, 2011). 
15 Art. 80 of the Swiss Civil Code: “A foundation is established by endowment of assets for a particular 
purpose.”  
16 This distinction comes from Roman law, which differentiates between foundations (Universitas 
Rerum), as institutions based on assets, and associations (Universitas Personarum), as institutions based on 
membership. Prewitt, K., “Foundations,” in The Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook, 2nd ed., Powell, W. & 
Steinberg, R. (eds.) (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), p. 355.  
17 The term civil society is used to describe associations of public interest that involve a nexus between 
the family, the state, and the market. Departing from the notion of citizenship, the concept of civil society has 
been defined by philosophers since the time of classical liberalism. See the definition in Anheier, K. H. et al., A 
Dictionary of Civil Society, Philanthropy, and the Nonprofit Sector (Routledge, 2005), p. 54. 
18 Together, these institutions form part of what is known as “the third sector.” The term was introduced 
by Amitai Etzioni and later adopted by the International Society for Third-Sector Research (ISTR) as a unifying 
label. The term highlights the fact that this sector emerged independently of the market (the first sector) and the 
State (the second sector). Anheier et al. suggest that the term “the third sector” is being replaced by “the third 
system.” This latter expression is used to identify an array of organizations that are neither governmental 
agencies nor for-profit firms. The term is deemed broader than the third sector, as it includes elements of the 
informal economy. Anheier, K. H. et al., A Dictionary of Civil Society, Philanthropy, and the Nonprofit Sector. 
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anarchy would reign.19 Markets work properly when private initiative and individual 
ambitions can flourish.20 The government, markets, and society act interdependently. The 
third sector, by contrast, does not exist on the basis of a social mandate, nor do its institutions 
compete in a market. However, it nevertheless realizes a purpose that may belong either to the 
government or to the market.21 
But the pursuit of these objectives is not per se a warranty of a foundation’s survival. 
If a government considers that a foundation’s role is not being performed adequately, the 
government might try to take over the task of the foundation or even eliminate it.22 Similarly, 
if a company sees an opportunity for financial profit in any of the foundations’ activities, it 
might seek to pursue them itself.  
Therefore, foundations exhibit singular characteristics. First, they operate by 
performing activities that originally belong to the public sector, yet they cannot obligate 
society. Second, foundations can canvass for sponsors, resources, and popular support, but 
without offering profit in return. Therefore, although they can attract resources, they cannot 
function like classical investment schemes by offering a return on capital.  
This commitment to delivering public goods without being subject to the controls of a 
centralized power or for-profit incentives raises questions as to how foundations can exist and 
sustain themselves over time.23 These considerations lead us to ask what essential criteria 
allow institutions to be defined as grant-making foundations and to investigate whether 
transparency plays a role in establishing these criteria.  
In principle, the fundamental assets that constitute a foundation are its dedication to its 
purpose and the value of its endowment. Do other characteristics constitute a foundation’s 
specific identity? The answer is yes: A foundation depends on the goodwill and financial 
support that it receives from both public and private sources.  
The various legal frameworks that govern foundations demonstrate the government’s 
interest in ensuring that their status is protected by its regulations. These regulations support 
foundations by granting them status as independent legal entities, by exempting them from the 
tax regimes, and by introducing tax waivers on gifts and donations that may be capitalized. In 
addition to these benefits, governments can support foundations directly by contracting with 
them, granting them funds, and outsourcing certain public activities to them. Companies can 
also support foundations by donating tax-exempt funds and by directly contracting with them 
to develop charitable activities. 
In fact, if a foundation is able to exploit a favorable legal framework, its activities can 
be both permitted by the government and supported by the private sector. This privilege 
implies that the foundation conveys its message to society and that society endorses its 
                                                          
19 “When governments no longer provide public goods or services, failure looms.” Rotberg, R., “Failed 
States in a World of Terror,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 81, no. 4 (July-August 2002), p. 131. 
20 Applying also to John Locke’s views on freedom and the granting of property rights, the absence of 
which would menace the freedom of human beings to achieve social and economic development. For example, 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UNHRD), Article 27 (2), states: “Everyone has the right to the 
protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which 
he is the author.” UNHRD adopted in December, 1948.  
21 Prewitt, “Foundations,” p. 356. 
22 Or conversely, due to a foundation’s high level of performance, a government might find its 
legitimacy threatened vis-à-vis society.  
23 We are not suggesting here that either the public sector or market players have a guaranteed survival. 
When a majority of the people turn against their government, they usually cause it to fail. At the same time, 
markets work properly when some players win while others fail. See Prewitt, “Foundations,” p. 357.  
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credibility. Reputation is therefore important to foundations. It functions as a kind of “moral 
credit,” which can generate resources and help establish a favorable regulatory environment.  
Furthermore, foundations are normally not alone in their domain. They are compelled 
to monitor the memberships and responsibilities of other foundations.24 Thus, the 
philanthropic sector, like the for-profit sector, is driven by a kind of competitive dynamic.25 
Because foundations must strive to survive, this competitive dynamic must be embedded in 
their founding criteria.  
Therefore, in addition to the endowment, foundations need a strong relationship with 
the public and the private sectors of society in order to function. The endowment gives the 
foundation a kick-start, but its relationship with the community is what sustains it in the long 
run.  
Consequently, if foundations rely on reputation to function successfully, it can be 
logically assumed that rules and principles on transparency will play an important role. 
However, this role must also be contextualized. Part III outlines the issues relating to 
transparency and its limits in this context today.  
III. Transparency and Its Limits 
Here, we discuss the general aspects of transparency and its limits with regard to the 
constitution and operation of foundations. These issues are of a functional character, and 
therefore apply equally to Swiss- and non-Swiss-based foundations.  
A. Transparency and Access to Information Today 
First of all, it seems undeniable that today’s unprecedented access to information can 
trigger changes in the relationship between economic actors and the community. 
Communication technologies matter more than ever before. Never before has the human 
being enjoyed such an abundance of available information. The challenge is not about looking 
for the information; it is rather about processing it.26 Although this surfeit of information does 
not necessarily result in “improved” knowledge, it renders traditional cases of secrecy almost 
impracticable.  
Issues such as digital technologies, the convergence of media, and the architecture for 
distributing information—both legal and illegal—have dramatically changed with the 
introduction of Internet Web 2.0.27 Furthermore, devices to process information are 
inexpensive, and sophisticated skills are not required to operate, edit, and distribute 
information. This has provoked a radical shift in the way society and its institutions 
communicate with each other. Traditional practices based on secrecy are no longer 
acceptable. Foundations should follow this trend and avoid old-fashioned strategies based on 
scarcity of information.28 
                                                          
24 Prewitt, K., “Foundations,” p. 355. 
25 Posner, R. and Philipson, T., “Antitrust in the Non-Profit Sector,” NBER Working Paper Series 
(March 2006), p. 2. 
26 Capurro, R., “Towards an Information Ecology,” in Wormell, I. (ed.), Information and Quality 
(London: Taylor, Graham, 1990), 122-139.  
27 An iconic example of this was the decrypting and releasing of a video, entitled 
CollateralMurder.com., which shows the murdering of civilians, journalists, and children in Iraq. Sifry, M., 
Wikileaks and the Age of Transparency (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011).   
28 For example, a Spanish study provides a model that allows the level of transparency of different 
NGOs to be assessed online. Gálvez Rodríguez, M., Caba Pérez, M., & López Godoy, M., “Determining Factors 
in Online Transparency of NGOs: A Spanish Case Study,” Voluntas, International Society for Third-Sector 
Research and Johns Hopkins University, 2011.  
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B. Transparency as an Integral Component of the Current International Legal and 
Economic Order 
Today, transparency has an increasing role to play across different sectors. In the 
converging dynamic that has existed since the early 1990s, national governments seem to 
“cede” sovereignty, economic integration takes place,29 and private players progressively 
adopt business models that operate across several jurisdictions.30 Issues of transparency are of 
particular importance in intergovernmental operations and public-private sector relations,31 
where it is essential to avoid any secrecy that might undermine the business climate, 
sociopolitical opportunities for change, or global security.32  
The third sector is also affected by this. For example, after the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001, financial regulations were among the first to be affected33 in order to 
trace movements of capital by private players, especially in the recommendations of the 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) of October 2003 and its nine34 supplementary 
recommendations.35 The eighth recommendation addresses the regulation of non-profit 
organizations: 
Depending on the legal form of the NPO and the country, NPOs may often be subject 
to little or no governmental oversight (for example, registration, record keeping, 
reporting and monitoring), or few formalities may be required for their creation (for 
example, there may be no skills or starting capital required, no background checks 
necessary for employees). Terrorist organizations have taken advantage of these 
characteristics of NPOs to infiltrate the sector and misuse NPO funds and operations 
to cover for or support terrorist activity. 36 
In an economically integrated world, this recommendation constitutes a strong 
warning call for the global philanthropic sector. The need for instruments and regulations 
aimed at avoiding secrecy, albeit for different reasons, is just as clear for the third sector as it 
is for other key economic areas, such as trade and public finance. 
                                                          
29 The conclusion of the GATT Uruguay Round and the establishment of the WTO are part of this 
trend, which, in fact, can be traced back to the Bretton Woods Agreement in 1944 and the founding of the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund, whose aim was to build a more integrated economic order. See 
Bhagwati, J., Protectionism (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989), ch. 1.  
30 For a critical view from the perspective of global economic regulation, see Braithwaite, J., & Drahos, 
P., Global Business Regulation, Part I (Cambridge University Press, 2000).  
31 Transparency also plays a role in the financial sector, although it has been said that: “The money 
markets rely more on trust than transparency, because transactions are so quick that there is little time to assess 
information.” “Full Disclosure: The Case for Transparency in Financial Markets is Not Clear-cut,” Economist, 
Feb. 19, 2009.  
32 For example, within the WTO System, transparency is a fundamental principle of the organization 
that aims to regulate information flows among trading partners. Hoekman, B., & Kostecki, M., The Political 
Economy of the World Trading System: The WTO and Beyond, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2001), p. 61. Likewise, International Standards of Supreme Audit Institutions (ISSAI) of the International 
Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI) sets transparency standards for public finance at 
Principles of Transparency and Accountability ISSAI 20. www.issai.org.  
33 Pieth, M., Financing Terrorism (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002), p. 158. 
34 http://www.fatfgafi.org/document/28/0,3746,en_32250379_32236920_33658140_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
35 Of 2001, incorporating all subsequent amendment until 2008. http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/document/9/0,3746,en_32250379_32236920_34032073_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
36 http://www.fatfgafi.org/document/22/0,3746,en_32250379_32236920_43757718_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
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C. Transparency and the Essence of the Legal Structure of Foundations  
If transparency is considered a key asset in the theoretical constitution of a foundation, 
this must be reflected in its actual operations. Yet well-accepted legal principles are not 
necessarily self-explanatory. However well accepted these principles are in theory, their 
formulation does not easily translate into practice. Historical and structural factors can 
conspire against the straight execution of accepted principles.  
In the case of foundations, it might even be argued that, as legal institutions, they do 
not appear to have any immediate connection with transparency issues. This might be because 
foundations are not publicly associated with a democratic ethos that categorically requires 
transparency. The fact that wealthy people can divert resources—which would otherwise have 
to be contributed through taxes to the public budget—in order to satisfy what they personally 
and independently determine to be an unmet need of public character, is hardly aligned to any 
democratic axiom.37  
In fact, the philosophical underpinnings of foundations reveal a laissez-faire heritage. 
That is, this sector’s principles have little to do with public policy issues.38 The architecture of 
third-sector institutions omits to identify precise beneficiaries who can assert rights against a 
foundation—an approach adopted by many people who establish charities using a foundation. 
These factors conspire against transparency.  
For example, when contrasting the structure of a foundation to that of a company, one 
marked difference is that the latter is vested with a board that is obliged to submit a periodic 
account of its actions to its principal—that is, its shareholders.39 This requirement has a 
tremendous impact on the field of corporate law.40 The structure of a foundation has no such 
internal control mechanism. Once a foundation has been established, it operates by following 
the directives of its board of management. As the foundation board does not have the duty to 
distribute periodic benefits to stakeholders, there are no parties entitled to demand 
accountability for the foundation’s actions. The foundation is not required to report on the size 
of gifts and donations, for example, or on the use of the dedicated assets.41  
Thus a foundation operates solely under the management of the board. The board’s 
main duty is to fulfill the founder’s will (the foundation’s purpose). In this sense, the will of 
the founder attains a sort of legal character vis-à-vis the authority before the foundation is 
registered, and sometimes even in face of the tax authority. But as foundations are normally 
expected to continue their existence beyond the life of the founder, the task of determining 
who has the right to enforce the will of the founder is not simple. Of course, to some extent 
                                                          
37 Consequently, it is not astonishing at all that foundations have been labeled “quasi-aristocratic 
institutions.” Anheier, H. K., & Daly, S., Politics of Foundations, p. 4; Prewitt, K., “Foundations,” p. 374. 
38 Brody, E., “The Legal Framework for Nonprofit Organizations,” in The Nonprofit Sector: A Research 
Handbook, 2nd ed., Powell, W. W., & Steinberg, R. (eds.) (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), p. 243. 
39 Milton Friedman: “[T]he whole justification for permitting the corporate executive to be selected by 
the stockholders is that the executive is an agent serving the interest of the principal.” Friedman, M., “The Social 
Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Profits,” New York Times Magazine, September 13, 1970. 
40 “Much of corporate law can be understood as an effort to control the agency problems that arise from 
the opportunist managers vis-à-vis shareholders, controlling shareholders vis-à-vis minority shareholders, and 
the company vis-à-vis its non-shareholders’ constituencies such as creditors and employees.” Hertig, G., 
Kraakman, R., & Rock, E., “Issuers and Investor Protection,” in The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative 
and Functional Approach, Kraakman, R., Davies, P., Hansmann, H., Hertig, G., Hopt, K., Kanda, H., & Rock, E. 
(eds.) (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 195. 
41 Albeit that active fundraising operations actually trigger some regulatory duties vis-à-vis the public 
authority.  
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the public authority has the right to monitor the functions of a foundation. But once a 
foundation has been established, the supervisory vigilance of the state is not mandatory.  
At the same time, if the government were to introduce an aggressive supervisory 
policy over the foundations registered within its jurisdiction, there would very likely be a 
strong reaction in defense of the foundation’s independent status. Beyond the standard 
accounting rules common to all economic actors vested with a legal personality, foundations 
are not legally compelled to provide information to the regulatory authority. In this sense, it 
can be said that, even though the will of the founder has some legal character, and the status 
of legal entity ensures that a framework exists to fulfill that will, there is no legislation to 
ensure that foundation funds are handled systematically. Moreover, even in cases where the 
public authority obliges funds channeled through foundations to undergo closer scrutiny, this 
is normally done to identify dishonest tax avoidance, not to shed light on the foundations’ 
management activities.  
D. Transparency and the Privacy Aspect of the Act of Giving  
Apart from the initial endowment, foundations are nourished by gifts and donations. It 
would therefore be reasonable to track not only where these funds originate, but also where 
they go.42  
In principle, a philanthropic gift in the form of a contribution or a donation constitutes 
the voluntary, irrevocable transfer of an asset (money, property, rights of exploitation, etc.) by 
one person to an organization dedicated to a public purpose. Generally, this act is made 
without an expectation of receiving something in exchange. The only condition normally 
attached to this transaction is that the assets given be dedicated to the purpose for which they 
were transferred.43 Moreover, when a foundation ceases operation after receiving a gift, then 
the gift will most likely be channeled to another charitable institution with a similar purpose 
rather than returned to the donor. Gifts, once given, do not find their way back to the giver.  
The act of giving anonymously can be especially revered. The reason for this is rooted 
in religious traditions and other beliefs as well as in psychological motivations. From this 
perspective, confidentiality may be important enough for the philanthropic sector to want to 
protect it against hostile regulation or operating rules.44 However, anonymity certainly 
contributes toward obfuscating the sector.  
New trends in philanthropy suggest that the sector is being modernized. Donors are 
increasingly assisted by well-established financial planners specialized in this sector, who can 
provide a more holistic view of a charitable portfolio.45 However, nothing suggests that old 
and new approaches to philanthropy cannot coexist.  
                                                          
42 In Spain, for instance, there is a foundation that tracks the transparency of NGOs as a guide for 
donors. See: http://www.fundacionlealtad.org/web/home 
43 See also Anheier, H. K. et al.  
44 For an economic analysis of the different reasons that prompt people to donate and provide gifts for 
charitable purposes, from hedonistic motives to normative reasons, see Kolm, S., “Introduction to the Economics 
of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity,” in Handbook of the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity: 
Foundations, Vol. 1, Kolm, S., and Ythier, J. M. (eds.), Handbooks in Economics (Elsevier, 2006), pp. 52-90. 
45 Havens, J. J., O’Herlihy, M. A., Schervish, P. G., “Charitable Giving: How Much, By Whom, To 
What, and How?”, in The Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook, 2nd edition, Powell, W., and Steinberg, R. 
(eds.) (Yale University Press, 2006), p. 560. 
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E. The Work of Foundations and the Limits of Transparency 
Rules on transparency are normally understood as a bulwark against institutional 
abuses relating to trade, taxation, or other economic activities—that is, situations in which 
pernicious private interests pursue objectives that undermine the market or the public.  
Banks and foundations differ considerably, yet they perform similar roles. Banks 
reduce the transaction costs between lenders and borrowers of money. Beyond their own 
endowment, foundations perform a similar role in the philanthropic market, by gathering 
contributions and donations to be channeled to the different social programs. Just as banks are 
intermediaries between lenders and borrowers of credit, foundations are intermediaries 
between funders and beneficiaries of aid. In the end, both institutions mediate the problems 
created by information asymmetries.46  
Notwithstanding these similarities, banks are subject to far more regulation than 
foundations. Banking regulations are substantially stricter in the realm of transparency. This is 
related to the banking business model expressed in the deposit contract, by which the 
depositor keeps the upside of the business (which is limited) and assumes the whole downside 
loss.47 This context highlights why transparency is so important in this industry.48  
However, transparency can at times undermine the banking business model.  
Particularly in times of financial stress, full transparency can reduce a bank’s flexibility. 
Depositors may withdraw their funds at once.49 This may worsen the crisis and potentially 
induce a market collapse.   
In the foundation sector, the general trend towards transparency is facilitated by new 
technologies and contemporary approaches to communication, as well as by recent 
international legal recommendations. On their own, some foundations have started to provide 
detailed information about their organization and activities on their websites.50 It is in the 
foundation’s interest to implement transparency rules in all its operations. Improved 
transparency helps attract funding, volunteers, and permanent memberships. It also 
communicates a message to society that foundations warrant people’s trust. Such trust is a 
foundation’s most valuable asset.  
Nonetheless, as illustrated by the banking regulation case, caution is appropriate. 
Foundations undertake activities of a public character that are not addressed by the State or 
the private sector.51 In pursuing their objectives, sometimes foundations need to operate under 
a veil of discretion. This is because their activities often relate only to a small segment of 
society, whose members do not have the opportunity or the skill to form a powerful 
                                                          
46 As in the case of “lemons,” where the “the purchaser’s problem is to identify quality,” elaborated by 
Akerlof, G., “The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism,” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, vol. 84, no. 3 (August 1970), p. 495. We can suggest that the primary problem people face when 
lending or giving away money is identifying the most efficient institutions in which to place their assets.  
47 Allenspach, N., “Banking and Transparency: Is More Information Always Better?”, Swiss National 
Bank, Working Papers (2009/11), p. 3.  
48 However, it has been said that the banking sector needs disclosure more than transparency. Since 
financial information tends to be very complex, only the disclosure of relevant items of information by top 
managers to rating agencies and insurance firms really has an effect on the market. See Healy, P. M., Krishna, 
G., Palepu, K.G., “Information Asymmetry, Corporate Disclosure, and the Capital Markets: A Review of the 
Empirical Disclosure Literature,” Journal of Accounting & Economics, 31 (2001), pp. 405-440. 
49 Allenspach, N., p. 3.  
50 See for example http://www.grstiftung.ch/en.html. 
51 Or sometimes activities differently undertaken, either by the state or the private sector.  
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democratic presence.52 Furthermore, foundation activities can draw a harsh reaction. 
Examples of charitable acts that might arouse public concern include attempts to integrate 
potential terrorists into society, studies on the benefits of euthanasia, research on gender 
change, and help for asylum seekers. In an open society, foundations should have the freedom 
to pursue social change53 and to challenge established limits.54 They must have sufficient 
autonomy to undertake unpopular tasks.55  
A foundation may also need privacy when it operates outside its jurisdiction in 
undemocratic countries. A requirement at home that it fully account for its actions can 
produce devastating consequences for the people it is trying to help and protect.56 Therefore, 
transparency legislation must not obstruct the foundation’s mandate, its manager’s strategy, 
the assignment of its assets, or any other aspect of its work.57  
To strike the optimal balance, a strategy should distinguish between structural 
transparency and performance-related transparency. Structural transparency relates to the 
internal framework of the foundation, including the purpose, quantity of assets, board 
members, and rules on the destination and the granting of funds. Performance-related 
transparency relates to the activities of the foundation, including their relationship to its 
purpose.  
Arguably, the public wants principally to be able to assess the individuals responsible 
for administering the foundation assets. Structural transparency is likely to suffice in 
establishing credibility. By contrast, transparency regulations that focus on the activities of 
the foundation can jeopardize its ability to fulfill its purpose.  
As will be explained below, Switzerland’s transparency regulations deal 
predominantly with a foundation’s structure rather than its activities.  
IV. Swiss Legal and Institutional Framework for Foundations 
Swiss law establishes three main forms of foundation:  classic foundations, known 
also as charitable foundations, which are regulated primarily in the Swiss Civil Code (SCC); 
family and ecclesiastical foundations, which are not specifically regulated in the SCC; and 
foundations consisting of retirement schemes for employees, which are regulated under other 
special legal regimes. In addition, there are business foundations, which, though 
“unregulated” by the SCC, seem to be recognized in jurisprudence.58  
                                                          
52 Otherwise these groups would be able to force the state to act on their behalf.  
53 Prewitt, K., p. 355.  
54 Id. 
55 An example of this is the work of the Ford Foundation and the African-American civil rights 
movement during the 1960s. Berman, H. E., “The Foundations’ Role in American Foreign Policy: The Case of 
Africa, Post-1945,” in Philanthropy and Cultural Imperialism: The Foundations at Home and Abroad, Anove, 
R. F. (ed.) (Boston: G. K. Hall & Co., 1980), p. 205. 
56 For example, German foundations that are extensively involved in efforts to democratize foreign 
countries since 1960 include the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, the Henrich 
Boell Foundation, the Hanns Seidel Foundation, and the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation. However, these 
foundations no longer exist as foundations; in fact, today, they are associations. Alexander Mohl analyzes their 
work in Mohr, A., The German Political Foundations as Actors in Democracy Assistance (Boca Raton, FL: 
Universal-Publishers, 2010).  
57 For example, for decades U.S. Government aid was not welcome in China, the Soviet Union, and 
many developing countries, whereas U.S. foundations were allowed to operate in them. Berman, H. E., p. 205. 
58 See the study by Würmli, M., Das gemeinnützige Unternehmen, (s. 901). Pratique Juridique Actuelle, 
Dike Verlag AG, AJP (2010).  
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In Switzerland, the law applicable to foundations is laid down in Articles 80 through 
89bis59 of the Swiss Civil Code,60 whose last reformed version61 entered into force on January 
1, 2006,62 pursuant to Article 1 of the Concluding Section of the SCC.63 A legal regime 
applicable to the auditors of foundations is stipulated in the Federal Ordinance of August 24, 
2005.64 The Swiss Confederation, through the Federal Supervisory Authority on Foundations 
of the Secretariat of the Federal Department of Home Affairs (FDHA),65 exercises oversight 
authority over foundations registered in Switzerland which have a national (or sometimes 
international) purpose.66 This supervisory authority is based on Article 84.2 of the SCC, by 
which “The supervisory authority must ensure that the foundation’s assets are used for their 
declared purpose.”67 (Foundations are also supervised locally at cantonal level, a topic that 
lies beyond the scope of this article.)  
A. Transparency and the Law 
Few legal provisions directly address transparency; instead, provisions of this kind are 
implicitly included within the different sets of legal regulations. Basically, the transparency-
related regulations applicable to grant-making foundations can be divided according to two 
implementation phases: when the foundation is formed, and when the foundation is 
administered.  
The scope of regulation dealing with the formation of foundations can be extended to 
investigate two issues. First, regulations seek to trace and determine the origin of gifts and 
donations which are incorporated into the endowment, but which do not form part of the 
original endowment itself. The purpose is to ensure that foundations do not host illegal assets 
and do not get used to divert assets. Second, regulations may come into play when the 
foundation’s purpose is changed, including upon the request of the founder. Such a change 
will alter the subjective aspect of a foundation.  
The scope of regulation dealing with the administration of the foundation covers three 
areas. First is the management process for ensuring that grants are allocated on an objective 
and systematic basis. Second, regulation addresses the obligations and duties associated with 
annual reporting and accounting. These managerial functions aim to ensure predictable levels 
of expenses and to provide a rational approach to administration that will help secure the 
foundation’s long-term survival. A third category of regulations concerns the rules, duties, 
and assignment of managers, as well as the organization of the foundation’s managerial 
bodies in their relations with external auditors. These specifications seek to address and avoid 
                                                          
59 Article 89bis is not analyzed in this paper, as it concerns employee benefits schemes.  
60 Swiss Civil Code (SCC), Part One: Law of Persons, Title Two: Legal Entities, Chapter Three.  
61 It is the first reform of Swiss foundation law since 1907.  
62 It is worth noting that the reform of the Swiss Civil Code provisions related to foundations occurred 
independently, and not as part of any attempt to harmonize the Swiss Regime with European legislation. 
Sprecher, T., Die Revision des Schweizerischen Stiftungsrechts (2006), p. 81. 
63 Final Title: Commencement and Implementing Provisions. 
64 www.bk.admin.ch/ch/f/as/2005/4555.pdf.  
65 Art. 3, al. (alinéa) 2, let. A, de l’ordonnance sur l’organisation de Département Fédéral de l’intérieur 
(Art. 3, Abs. 2. Bst. a, Organisationsverordnung vom 28. Juni 2000 für das Eidgenössische Departement des 
Innern (OV-EDI)) SR 172.212.1. 
66 http://www.edi.admin.ch/esv/index.html. 
67 http://www.edi.admin.ch/esv/00465/00466/index.html?lang=fr. 
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the so-called agency problem. The structural problems of a foundation’s management do not 
relate directly to agency problems, but rather result from a lack of agents.68  
B.  The Swiss Foundation Code 
Beyond the SCC and related federal and cantonal regulations, the philanthropic sector 
has formulated the Swiss Foundation Code in an effort of self-regulation.69 Self-regulation by 
private parties can offer advantages over state compulsory regulation.70 Perhaps the most 
obvious advantage that private-sector participants have over public authorities is specialized 
know-how and experience. This permits them to more easily spot the weaknesses in 
stewardship that need to be regulated. Nonetheless, self-imposed standards can have a 
downside if they are drafted by better equipped players in the philanthropic sector, such as 
large foundations. The imposition of sophisticated standards can cause small players to 
default without being culpable of any transgression per se, simply because they lack the 
means to fulfill the standards. It is therefore advisable to gather opinions from different 
members of the sector when fashioning self-regulation. Another point to consider concerns 
the relationship between the sector’s regulatory body and the regulated parties. Parties within 
the sector are likely to have common interests. In this regard, problems related to capturing 
regulatory omissions may arise between the sector’s players and ad hoc regulators, as happens 
between regulated parties and the public authority.71  
In the case of the SFC, Swiss foundations (the Association of Swiss Grant-Making 
Foundations72) commissioned a working group of experts in 2004. The aim was to prepare 
recommendations on the formation and management of Swiss foundations.73 The first version 
appeared in 2005 under the heading Code of Best Practices, which was discussed and 
reviewed by members of Swiss foundations, the public authority, academia, organizations 
related to the philanthropic sector, and the private sector. The text was finally published under 
the name Swiss Foundation Code. It includes three main principles and 26 recommendations. 
The SFC is a guideline for the activities of foundations formed in Switzerland.74 It is not a 
management guide,75 and its recommendations are not mandatory.76  
                                                          
68 Although certain voices suggest that foundations should adopt a “principal/agent” structure akin to 
the organization of a company. See the section Discussion in EFC, Exploring Transparency and Accountability 
Regulation of Public-Benefit Foundations in Europe (2011), p. 9.  
69 Other European countries also have a panoply of self-regulations involving transparency. See Breen, 
O., “Through the Looking Glass: European Perspectives on Non-Profit Vulnerability, Legitimacy and 
Regulation,” Brooklyn Journal of International Law, vol. 36, no. 3 (2011), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1932653, p. 969. 
70 Brody, E., “The Legal Framework for Nonprofit Organizations,” in The Nonprofit Sector: A Research 
Handbook, 2nd ed., Powell, W. W., & Steinberg, R. (eds.) (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), p. 257.  
71 Id. 
72 Grant-making foundations are those foundations that have the means either to develop their own 
projects or to finance the projects undertaken by other parties. These are foundations which, in their essence, can 
develop independently.  
73 Even though the foundations targeted by the SFC are the so-called “large” foundations, the 
introductory part of the Code includes the caveat that its recommendations should not be applied too rigorously 
in the case of smaller foundations, in order to prevent them from being overwhelmed by its provisions, and yet 
allow them to profit from the Code guidelines. See SFC, p. 13.  
74 In its introductory section, the Code also contemplates the adjustment of its principles and 
recommendations applicable to foundations that are initially established under a foreign jurisdiction. See SFC, p. 
13. 
75 See also SFC, p. 14. 
76 See SFC, pp. 14-15. 
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The SFC is divided into four chapters, which address the foundation’s establishment,77 
leadership,78 grant-making,79 and finances.80 The code sets forth “three General Principles, 
which must always be observed simultaneously by the management of any modern 
foundation. These principles relate to: (1) the Effective Implementation of the Foundation’s 
Purpose; (2) Checks and Balances; and (3) Transparency.”81 The first principle aims to ensure 
that a foundation’s work is executed pursuant to its legal purpose. The second principle 
addresses the foundation’s managerial structure. The third principle focuses on the 
relationship between the foundation and society in general.  
C. The Swiss Legal System at Work 
The rest of this article deals with the Swiss legal framework on foundations. It 
primarily deals with the provisions of applicable federal law, such as the Swiss Civil Code, 
and presents these in the context of regulated acts over the life of a foundation. Where 
relevant, the article notes the interplay between the recommendations of the SFC and the 
provisions of the SCC. A brief comment on the applicability of the principle of transparency 
closes the analysis of each piece of regulation.  
1. Formation and Registration of Foundations 
A. Swiss Civil Code 
Article 80 of the SCC (on formation)82 lays down the basic principle that defines the 
foundation as being “established by the endowment of assets83 for a particular purpose.”84 
The act of allocating an endowment to a particular purpose and registering it in the 
commercial register gives the foundation its legal personality.85 Article 81, para. 1, of the 
SCC stipulates that a foundation can be established by a public deed—inter vivos—or by a 
testamentary disposition.86 A foundation can also be established by contract of inheritance 
(pacte successoral)87 under the jurisprudence developed by the Swiss Federal Tribunal.88 
Article 81, para. 2, of the SCC stipulates that a foundation must be entered in the commercial 
                                                          
77 Including Recommendations 1-3.  
78 Including Recommendations 4-15. 
79 Including Recommendations 16-19. 
80 Including Recommendations 20-26. 
81 Swiss Foundation Code 2009, Foundation Governance, vol. 9 (Helbing Litchtenhahn Verlag).  
82 Article 80 A. Foundation I. In General.  
83 In some countries, the law stipulates that the endowment must have a minimum threshold value. This 
is not the case of Switzerland, though in practice the Swiss authority requests a minimum amount before 
registration.  
84 In some European countries, the law requests that the purpose be published and expressly defined as 
being of a public-benefit. See EFC, Exploring Transparency and Accountability Regulation of Public-Benefit 
Foundations in Europe (2011). This level of precision is absent from the SCC.  
85 Thus, in Switzerland, registration functions as a state approval for grant-making foundations; whereas 
in other European countries, such as France, registration is not required. Alternatively, registration is achieved 
subject to judicial approval and not by state approval. See id., pp. 12-13.  
86 The rules of formal testamentary disposition are governed by Article 498 A. Wills, I. Drawing up a 
will, 1. In general, Article 499 et seq. governs the requirements of testament established by public deed. The 
rules of hand-written testaments are governed by Article 505 (on Holographic will). Article 506 (on Oral will, 
dispositions) et seq. govern the rules on oral declarations of testamentary nature.  
87 The requirements for contracts of succession are set forth in Article 512 et seq. of the SCC. In order 
to be valid, the contract of succession must be vested with formal requirements of a will executed as a public 
deed and the intention of the parties must be declared before the public authority.  
88 Sprecher, T., New Features in Swiss Foundation Law (2006), p. 9. 
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register, pursuant to its charter, in accordance with any directions issued by the supervisory 
authority, and naming the members of the board of trustees. Finally, Article 81, para. 3, 
stipulates that the probate authority shall inform the commercial registrar of the creation of a 
foundation by testamentary disposition.89 Upon subsequent notification of the supervisory 
authority, the registrar will exercise supervision.90  
B. Swiss Foundation Code 
The first recommendation of the SFC concerns the examination of the founder’s 
intent. In particular, the recommendation seeks (a) to ensure that the founder’s intent 
corresponds to a societal need, and that that an independent foundation is an appropriate 
vehicle to deal with this need, taking into account its assets; (b) to determine whether the 
foundation is to have a permanent or limited existence, and, if permanent, to set up a 
framework for electing or replacing board members; and (c) to ensure a level of coherence in 
terms of the foundation’s will, purpose, organization, and assets disposed.91  
The second recommendation of the SFC deals with the legal domicile of the 
foundation. In principle, the recommendation states that the foundation should be established 
where its main grant-making activity takes place. However, geographic proximity is not the 
only concern; a foundation’s domicile determines its legal framework and supervisory 
authority. In addition, the recommendation states that tax issues should be evaluated when 
setting the domicile of the foundation.92  
The third recommendation deals with the internal documents and bylaws of the 
foundation.93 The purpose of the foundation should be stated in the charter. Ancillary rules 
concerning the work of the foundation, which need to be adaptable, can be established in 
other documents or guidelines. In cases where the purpose is broadly defined, the founder 
should add a mission statement to serve as a strategic guideline for the board, which can be 
periodically revised.94  
2. Challenges by Heirs or Creditors 
Article 82 of the SCC95 states that the foundation can be challenged by the heirs or 
creditors in the same way that a gift may be challenged.  
3. Organization of Foundations 
A. Swiss Civil Code 
The charter stipulates the governing bodies of the foundation and its method of 
administration.96 If the authority of the commercial register sees a lack of coherence between 
the way in which the foundation has been organized and its legal mandate, the authority will 
notify the pertinent supervisory authority of the foundation, which will need to redress these 
                                                          
89 Art. 81.3 of the SCC.  
90 Sprecher, T. New Features in Swiss Foundation Law (2006). 
91 See the Swiss Foundation Code 2009, with commentary. Sprecher, T., Egger, P., and Janssen, M., 
Foundation Governance, vol. 6., Helbing Lichtenhahn, Swiss Foundations (2009).  
92 See id.  
93 As the law does not have provisions on the bylaws of the foundation, this recommendation is very 
useful for newly formed foundations. 
94 See the Swiss Foundation Code 2009, with commentary.  
95 SCC, Article 82 III., Challenge by founder’s heirs or creditors.  
96 SCC, Article 83B, Organisation, I. In general. 
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deficiencies.97 The supervisory authority may set a deadline by which the foundation must 
establish its legal status, appoint an executive body (assuming this is vacant), or appoint an 
administrator (permanent or not) together with an assignment of competence. If the situation 
cannot be redressed and uncertainties persist regarding the feasibility of the foundation’s 
organization, the foundation’s assets can be donated to another institution that has a similar 
purpose.  
This is to be done irrespective of whether the deed of the foundation authorizes it or 
not.98 This provision constitutes a departure from the established Swiss legal regime on 
foundations, which did not give this power to the authority. Under such circumstances, the 
new regime even allows the authority to transfer the assets against the will of the founder and 
the members of the board, regardless what is stated in the deed.99  
B. Swiss Foundation Code 
The second cluster of recommendations of the SCF deals with organizational issues. 
The last of the 12 recommendations stipulates that the foundation should share information on 
its principles, grant-making activities, and procedures with the public. The recommendation 
aims to inform the public about the purpose of the foundation, its structure, and its areas of 
activity. The SFC advises that foundations make their “goals, guidelines and procedures 
governing grant-making activities” accessible to the public via a website. The 
recommendation states that the foundation should share this information with its beneficiaries, 
the public authority, and the public in general.  
Recommendation 4 provides rules for the functions of the board of trustees, which 
should be included in the foundation charter. The first recommendation states that the board 
should possess discretionary authority over its judgments and be free to hold independent 
opinions. Even if the founder is a member of the board, the other board members must remain 
autonomous. The board is entrusted with setting up the foundation’s short-, medium-, and 
long-term strategies to achieve its purposes. Taking into account the foundation’s charter, the 
board also has the power to periodically evaluate strategies of managers along with 
performances and policies of the foundation. 
Recommendation 5 states that in the absence of stipulations in the foundation’s 
charter, the board of trustees should draft procedures regarding the election of its members, 
their terms of office (two to five years per term), and rules governing their succession. 
Recommendation 6 deals with the number of members of the board of trustees (ideally five to 
seven). It suggests rules ensuring that foundation employees and board members receive 
adequate time to perform their functions and opportunities to benefit from training courses.  
Recommendation 7 suggests rules on board members’ remuneration, which ought to 
be commensurate with individual skill and experience, expended time, and performance. 
Although the recommendation indicates that board members will optimally perform their 
duties on a voluntary basis, it recognizes that members may require remuneration for their 
professional services. In this regard, the terms must be agreed in writing.  
Recommendations 8, 9, and 10 deal respectively with the board’s organization, the 
role of its chairperson, and the role of its committees. Meetings of the board should take place 
at least twice a year; they must be announced; decision-making procedures should be easy to 
comprehend; and minutes should be recorded. If necessary, the board should determine when 
to consult external experts. Recommendation 9 specifies the tasks entrusted to the chairperson 
                                                          
97 The foundation bears the cost of these diligences. Article 83d, IV, para. 3, of the SCC.  
98 SCC, Article 83d, IV. Organisational defects, point (2)  
99 Sprecher, T., New Features in Swiss Foundation Law (2006), pp. 9-10. 
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vis-à-vis the board and the management of the foundation. The chairperson moderates board 
meetings and communicates timely information to board members so that they are 
appropriately informed before each meeting. The chairperson’s duties, areas of competence, 
responsibilities, and term of office should be laid out in the foundation’s regulations or 
guidelines. Recommendation 10 outlines cases where the board might decide to set up 
permanent or ad hoc committees for specific tasks, such as overseeing finance, investments, 
grant-making, human resources, and remuneration. The board must ensure that the external 
members of these committees are independent and in no way associated with the people they 
must evaluate. The board of trustees should lay down the committee’s tasks in the 
foundation’s regulations and guidelines.  
Recommendation 11 deals with the rules governing potential conflicts of interest 
between a person’s role as a foundation board member or management member and his or her 
other professional or personal activities. The board is charged with drafting the rules on this. 
As a matter of principle, any situation presenting a potential conflict of interest should be 
avoided. Should such a case occur, it must be disclosed to the board. It may also have to be 
disclosed in the annual report.  
Recommendation 12 outlines the foundation’s tasks regarding public communication. 
The foundation has a duty to provide its members, its beneficiaries, the government, the 
public, and the media with information concerning its purpose and structure, along with its 
grant-making policy, strategies, and activities. It should purvey this information using modern 
media channels, such as a website. 
The function of management is addressed in Recommendation 13. The board of 
trustees should determine the skills, experience, duties, responsibilities, and compensation 
that its management should have and hire the management. Once hired, management should 
run the foundation’s operations under the supervision of the board of trustees.  
Recommendation 14 seeks to ensure that the auditing agency is not assigned any task 
other than what is required by statutory obligation. In particular, the board of trustees is 
cautioned against entrusting the auditing agency with the responsibility of managing 
foundation assets. The board must also make sure that the auditing agency or at least the head 
auditor is periodically replaced.  
Recommendation 15 deals with the appointment of permanent or ad hoc advisors and 
consultants. When the board needs new skills or simply assistance, it can employ an external 
work force. The foundation’s regulations or guidelines should state the task, areas of 
expertise, and responsibilities of such external workers. The rules on independence and 
remuneration of board members should apply equally to advisors, advisory committees, and 
other foundation bodies. 
4. Recommendations on the Work of Grant-making Foundations 
A. Swiss Civil Code 
The Swiss Civil Code is silent about the work undertaken by grant-making 
foundations in practice. 
B. Swiss Foundation Code 
SFC Recommendation 16 advises the board of trustees to document foundation policy 
in writing in order to serve as a reference framework. Grant-making and investment policies 
should be coordinated, and strategies should periodically be reevaluated in consideration of 
both society’s needs and the activities of other private and public grant-making institutions. 
The board should set midterm goals as well as possibilities for collaboration. 
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Recommendation 17 addresses grant-making. In accordance with its investment 
strategies, the board of trustees should determine distributable foundation income and 
disburse available funds in a timely manner. A foundation should conduct grant-making 
activities in a professional, business-like fashion. There must be communication with other 
private and public institutions to operate efficiently and to avoid duplicate granting. There 
should be an optimal ratio between administrative costs and grant-making activities. The 
foundation should have established criteria to determine its efficiency.  
Recommendation 18 advises that projects be evaluated and selected pursuant to the 
grant-making guidelines. The foundation should ensure that competent persons are in charge 
of such evaluation, and that it is done in an objective and timely manner. External committees 
or consultants may be used as well.  
Recommendation 19 recommends that once a grant has been awarded, the foundation 
enter into a contract with the beneficiary for the duration of the project. The foundation 
should define the terms of the contract. A foundation can attach conditions to the funding and 
monitor the fulfillment of those conditions.  
5. Recommendations on the Financial Management of Grant-Making Foundations  
A. Swiss Civil Code 
Article 83a (1) of the Swiss Civil Code on Foundations’ Accounting obliges the board 
of trustees to maintain the foundation’s accounts pursuant to the Code of Obligations on 
commercial accounting.  
Article 83a (2) addresses the situation where a foundation conducts a commercial 
operation in order to pursue its objects. In such a case, the foundation is required to follow the 
provisions in the Code of Obligations100 in respect to presenting public annual financial 
statements mutatis mutandis.101  
The obligations to submit annual financial statements and to keep accounts apply even 
to foundations that have been exempted from the obligation to designate an external auditor.  
B. Swiss Foundation Code 
Whereas the Swiss Civil Code (SCC) and Swiss Code of Obligations (SCO) provide 
standard rules on accounting and auditing applicable to grant-making foundations, the SFC 
provides rules on financial management specifically drafted to deal with a grant-making 
foundation’s daily activities. Recommendations 20 to 26 deal with finance.  
Recommendation 20 entrusts the board of trustees with the duty to guard against 
improper funds—those derived from money-laundering, terrorism, corruption, or any other 
criminal activity. Such funds must not constitute either the original endowment or the income 
from foundation activities. The board should also ensure a sound balance between the cash 
flow of the foundation’s assets and its grant-making activities. 
Recommendation 21 deals with investments. The board of trustees should prepare an 
explicit policy covering the investment process. Then the foundation should follow this policy 
in determining the investment strategy, implementing the strategy, and overseeing the results. 
Recommendation 22 states that the board should evaluate the foundation’s 
“risk-carrying capacity.” The foundation’s assets should be invested pursuant to a strategy 
consistent with the foundation’s purpose and its investment capacity, regardless of the 
personal preferences of the board.  
                                                          
100 SCO, Arts. 957 to 962. 
101 SCC, Article 83a II. Accounting 
18 
 
Recommendation 23 stipulates that the board should use a competitive and open 
submission procedure to determine what entity will implement its investment strategy.   
Recommendation 24 advises that the board of trustees systematically review 
investment results twice a year. Also, the investment strategy should be reviewed every two to 
three years. Results from the examination of investment returns and investment strategy 
should be recorded in writing.  
Recommendation 25 deals with the foundation’s investment plan. It advises that the 
board establish a plan for investing the foundation’s assets efficiently. The components of the 
plan should be specified in the investment regulations. In addition, the plan should mandate 
that investment and oversight are strictly independent of one another. If the foundation holds 
stock, the investment regulation of the board of trustees should establish rules for exercising 
rights on stocks. 
Recommendation 26 advises that the board of trustees administer the financial 
management of asset investment, budget planning, and the rendering of accounts. The annual 
financial reports should provide a complete, accurate, and transparent picture of the financial 
standing of the foundation. In addition, the board of trustees should generate a budget on the 
basis of its investment and disbursement plan. The foundation’s board should use the annual 
budget as well as financial reports as tools for management and supervision.  
6. Audit of Foundations102 
In principle, classic foundations must undergo a normal audit. Article 83b (1) of the 
Swiss Civil Code on Foundations’ Auditors mandates that the board of trustees appoint 
external auditors.103 However, this obligation can be waived by the supervisory authority. 
Article 83b (2) states that the Federal Council determines the conditions for such a waiver.104  
If there are no special provisions applicable to foundations, the rules of the Swiss 
Code of Obligations concerning external auditors of public limited companies are applicable 
mutatis mutandis.105 If the foundation has the duty to carry out a limited audit, the supervisory 
authority can order a full audit in order to obtain a reliable financial assessment of the 
foundation’s finances.106 The external auditors must provide the supervisory authority with a 
copy of the audit report as well as all important communications it had with the foundation.107  
Thus, in principle, the law stipulates that foundations must have auditors, and this is 
understood as a fundamental rule of transparency that increases credibility and offers 
confidence to donors.108 Nonetheless, the board of a foundation can request that the 
supervisory authority exempt it from the duty to designate an external auditor.109 The 
supervisory authority can agree, subject to the fulfillment of conditions specified by the Swiss 
Federal Council and stipulated by Article 1 of the Ordinance on the Audit of Foundations. 
These are: 
                                                          
102 This part on Audit of Foundations is based on Sprecher, T., New Features in Swiss Foundation Law 
(2006), pp. 10 ff.  
103 SCC, Article 83b III. Auditors (1). 
104 SCC, Article 83b III. Auditors (2). 
105 SCC, Article 83b III. Auditors (3). 
106 SCC, Article 83b III. Auditors (4). 
107 SCC, Article 83c 2. Supervisory authority. 
108 Sprecher, T., New Features in Swiss Foundation Law (2006), p. 10. 
109 This request by the foundation’s board implies that the exception is not granted ex officio by the 
supervisory authority.  
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• The foundation has a balance sheet that amounts to less than CHF 200,000.-, in 
two successive business years (subpara. (a)), and  
• The foundation refrains from raising capital either through public calls for 
donations or other contributions (subpara. (b)). 
These conditions are cumulative. The first condition demands that a foundation seeking to 
obtain this waiver must have undergone an external audit for at least two years prior to 
application, which is thus a mandatory step in the case of newly formed foundations. The 
second condition implies that exemption can only be granted to foundations that are not 
seeking donations.110 Although this waiver is unlimited in duration, it may be revoked by the 
supervisory authority if the requisite conditions change or if an audit is necessary in order to 
make a reliable assessment of the financial situation of the foundation.111  
Since an auditor might be a legal entity, a foundation might act as auditor for another 
foundation. This act must be pursuant to the foundation’s charter, and the requirements of 
independence must be satisfied “under the law governing audits.”112 
One of the innovations introduced by the law is the requirement that auditors be 
independent of the foundation. Sprecher points to four cases where independence can be 
questioned:113 
• The persons commissioned to undertake the audit must not be members of 
another executive body of the foundation which is to be audited. If the auditors 
are members of an associated body, the obligations and responsibilities of the 
foundation executive bodies should be strictly divided from each other. 
• Where the person commissioned to undertake the audit is an employee of the 
foundation, independence is jeopardized.  
• In principle, cases where the persons in charge of the audit are also beneficiaries 
of the foundation’s activities should be avoided.  
• In principle, cases where the persons in charge of the audit have a close 
relationship with members of the foundation’s executive bodies (e.g., family ties) 
should be avoided.  
In view of the above issues, Article 2, para. 1, of the Ordinance on the Audit of 
Foundations instructs the foundation to engage a qualified auditor:  
• if the foundation is raising funds and has received as gifts, donations or other 
contributions amounts exceeding 100,000 CHF in each of two successive 
business years; or 
• if the foundation’s finances exceed “any two of the following parameters” 
(subpara. b) during two successive business years: 
1) an overall balance sheet total of CHF 10 million, or 
2) a cash flow of CHF 20 million, or 
3) an annual average workforce of 50 full-time employees. 
                                                          
110 Sprecher, T., New Features in Swiss Foundation Law (2006). 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
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7. Supervisory Authority and Oversight of Foundations 
The Swiss Confederation itself, the Cantons, and within them, the Communes are 
entitled to supervise foundations. In principle, a foundation is supervised by the public 
authority to which it has been assigned. Nonetheless, the Swiss cantonal authorities can 
demand that a foundation supervised at communal level be supervised by the respective 
canton.114 This provision allows the cantonal public authority to supervise the activities of the 
foundation. The supervisory authority must make sure that the assets of the foundation are 
used for their declared purpose.115  
8. On the Over-Indebtedness and Insolvency of Foundations 
If a foundation is about to fall into insolvency or there are serious doubts about its 
financial capacity to meet its obligations, the board of trustees must draw up an interim 
balance sheet at liquidation values and submit this to the external auditors or, in the absence 
of external auditors, to the supervisory authority. If the external auditors identify such 
circumstances, they must notify the public authority directly. The supervisory authority must 
then command the board of trustees to take the necessary steps to redress the situation. If the 
board fails to do so, the supervisory authority will take these measures itself. As a last resort, 
the supervisory authority can take legal enforcement measures. The provisions of company 
law on commencement or deferral of compulsory dissolution apply to the foundation mutatis 
mutandis.116  
The “revocation of the foundation as a matter of civil law” does not represent a 
financial restructuring measure. This might also not be possible if the foundation is over-
indebted or if it runs counter to the will of creditors. Revocation is possible only if the legal 
enforcement process has been concluded and a surplus remains.117  
A foundation may fall into bankruptcy. If financial restructuring is no longer feasible, 
the Swiss Debt Enforcement and Bankruptcy Law (DEBL) will apply to the foundation, 
mutatis mutandis, as it does in the case of corporate bankruptcy.  
Finally, a foundation can issue a self-declaration of insolvency, pursuant to Article 39, 
para. 1, clause 12, of the DEBL.  
9. Bookkeeping 
Article 84b of the SCC118 sets the rules on bookkeeping for foundations. Foundations 
are subject to the duty to keep accounts, which is essential for auditing annual accounts as 
mandated by Article 83a, para. 3, of the SCC.119 The provisions on commercial bookkeeping 
of the Code of Obligations also apply here.120 
                                                          
114 SCC, Art. 84 C. Supervision 1bis.  
115 SCC, Art. 84 C. Supervision 2.  
116 SCC, Art. 84 Cbis, 4, Measures in the event of overindebtedness and insolvency.  
117 Sprecher, T., New Features in Swiss Foundation Law (2006), pp. 16-17.  
118 SCC, Article 84b. 
119 SCC, Article 83a II. Accounting. 
120 SCO, Arts. 957 et seq. 
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10. Changes in the Purpose of the Foundation 
Under Swiss law, the purpose of a foundation can be changed by the federal or the 
cantonal authority pursuant to a proposal made by the overseeing authority or by the board of 
trustees of the foundation.121  
11. Changes in the Foundation’s Object at the Founder’s Request 
Traditionally, foundations have been conceived of as being institutions that pursue 
perennial objects. When establishing a foundation, founders devote a good deal of wealth to 
the pursuit of an object that they expect will survive them. This intent of the founder is the 
motivational force underlying the foundation’s charter. The SCC recognizes the force of the 
founder’s will in Article 86a, which introduces the right of the founder to amend the 
foundation’s object by request, subject to the classical legal framework of foundations.  
The request to change the purpose of a foundation can be made by the founder directly 
or by testamentary disposition. However, some conditions have to be fulfilled: 
• At the time of setting up the foundation, the founder must have reserved the right 
to amend the purpose of the foundation. 
• The request should be directed by the founder to the competent public authority. 
This request can be made directly or by testament. If the request is by testament, 
the authority disclosing the testament should inform the relevant authority of this 
request.  
• This right to change the purpose of a foundation is personal. It cannot be passed 
to heirs or acquired by third parties. Therefore, if it is not exercised, it will end 
with the life of the founder. 
• In the case of several founders, the request for change of purpose may only be 
exercised jointly by all the co-founders. 
• In order to request the change, at least ten years must have elapsed since the 
creation of the foundation or the last change in the purpose of the foundation 
requested by the founder. This period of ten years ensures stability in the 
foundation’s activities. 
• If the founder is a legal entity, the right to change its purpose lasts for 20 years 
and is subsequently extinguished. This rule is aimed at preventing misuse of the 
right to change the foundation’s purpose and abuse of the foundation as a legal 
entity.122  
• If the purpose of the foundation which is to be changed is of a public or charitable 
nature in the sense of Article 56, subpara. G, of the Direct Federal Tax Act,123 the 
                                                          
121 A change in the purpose of the foundation might take place when the foundation’s original object 
has changed to such a degree that it is necessary to redirect the foundation’s purpose to the founder’s original 
intention in a more coherent way. SCC, Art. 86 II. Amendment of objects, 1. Request by the supervisory 
authority or the board of trustees 75.  
122 Sprecher, T., New Features in Swiss Foundation Law (2006), p. 20. 
123 DBG, Article 56, let. g, de la loi fédéral du 14 décembre 1990 sur l‘impôt fédéral direct, Art. 56, Bst. 
g, Bundesgesetz vom 14. Dezember 1990 über die direkte Bundessteuer; Art. 56, lit. g, Federal Income Tax 
Statute of 14 December 1990; SR 642.11.  
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new object of the foundation must also be a “public or charitable object” under 
the terms of that law.124  
Whereas Article 86 assigns the federal authority the competence to amend the 
foundation’s purpose, Article 86a assigns the supervisory authority the task of ensuring that 
the request for the foundation’s change of purpose has been executed according to the 
requirements of the law. Once the supervisory authority has ascertained this to be the case, it 
must order the change of purpose and notify the Commercial Register Office. The authority, 
however, has no mandate to make subjective evaluations of the new purpose or to suggest 
alternative purposes.125 
12. Dissolution of the Foundation and Deletion from the Register 
Article 88 gives the federal or cantonal authority the right to dissolve a foundation if 
its object has become unattainable and the foundation cannot be maintained by following the 
deed, or if the objects of the foundation become illegal or immoral.126 Any interested party 
has the right to apply to the public authority for the dissolution of a foundation. Once this 
request has been granted, the commercial registrar must be informed so that the foundation 
can be deleted from the register.127 Finally, courts have the power to terminate family or 
ecclesiastical foundations128 
V. Concluding Remarks 
This article has provided an account of the current Swiss legal regime applicable to 
foundations from a pro-transparency point of view. We began with a summary of the sector as 
it exists in Switzerland today. Our analysis focused on the legal provisions of the Swiss Civil 
Code and the Swiss Code of Obligations, together with the Swiss Foundation Code. We have 
also illustrated our analysis with functional aspects that are applicable to foundations beyond 
the borders of Switzerland. As a general conclusion, we hold that, in terms of the principles 
and practices related to transparency, the SFC provides a highly important self-regulation tool 
for Switzerland’s philanthropic sector.  
We close with comments on the analyzed provisions: 
[A] On formation of a foundation: A foundation can be established by an act inter-
vivos or an agreement as to succession. An issue of transparency might arise if the heirs of the 
testator do not fulfill the will expressed in the testament. However, the SCC permits the 
formation of foundations by testamentary disposition. This ruling reflects the institution’s 
regard for individual freedom.  
                                                          
124 Sprecher points out that this was a highly disputed issue during the drafting of the law, as there were 
concerns that the new right to alter the purpose of a foundation could become a loophole for tax abuse and give 
the founder an opportunity to repatriate assets. On the other hand, this limitation is aimed at guaranteeing that the 
individuals who contributed to the foundation by donations or other instruments are reassured that their assets 
remain devoted to a “public or charitable” purpose, even if the new purpose is not the same as the original one. 
Sprecher, T., New Features in Swiss Foundation Law (2006), p. 21. 
125 SCC, Article 86b gives the right to the supervising authority—upon hearing the board of trustees—to 
provide ancillary modifications to the foundation charter, if these are demanded for objective purposes and do 
not affect third parties’ rights. These minor changes provided by the supervising authority aim to simplify the 
procedures for establishing a foundation. SCC, Art. 86b III. Minor amendments to the charter.  
126 SCC, Article 88 F. Dissolution and deletion from the register. Dissolution by the competent 
authority.  
127 SCC, Article 89 II. Right to apply for dissolution, deletion from the register.  
128 SCC, Article 88 F. Dissolution and deletion from the register. I. Dissolution by the competent 
authority. 
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The SCC addresses this issue, albeit not in the section expressly dedicated to the 
regulation of foundations. So the duty of the heir to submit the will to the SCC129 must be 
read in conjunction with the provisions on “Reading the will” of the SCC, Article 557.130 The 
authority in charge of opening the testament must therefore notify the competent commercial 
register. The performance of this duty is the key to ensuring the fulfillment of the founder’s 
will.  
The more specific recommendations of the SFC address the functionality of the grant-
making foundation. First, the recommendations suggest a kind of proportionality test to 
evaluate the feasibility of a foundation’s achieving its objects given its means and 
organization. Recommendations 2 and 3 specify the level of coherence expected between the 
laws that are applied to foundations—including the tax regime—and the activities that 
foundations engage in. By anchoring the regulatory authority to the foundation’s legal 
domicile, the SFC intends to discourage forum shopping. At the same time, however, given 
today’s globalized economy, this provision should not limit foundations from operating across 
borders.  
Recommendation 3 of the SFC outlines essential documents that a foundation should 
provide regarding its internal organization, which should remain valid for the first five years 
of the foundation’s existence. Other documents include the foundation’s constitution, its 
internal organization, and its mission statement. This material provides fundamental, prima 
facie evidence of the new foundation’s objectives and principles. 
The first three SFC recommendations relate to regulatory requirements for the 
formation of foundations: the founder’s intent, the foundation’s legal domicile and regulatory 
authority, and the founding documentation. Although none of these recommendations directly 
address transparency, they deal with issues that are central to it.  
[B] On Article 82 of the SCC (Challenges by Heirs or Creditors): The SCC provision 
seeks to prevent foundations from being used as depositaries for assets diverted from their 
original legal destination by dishonest means: diluting assets entailed to a legal inheritance, or 
simulating a situation of insolvency by transferring assets to a foundation. Since these abuses 
do not directly concern to the functionality of foundations, the SFC does not refer to them 
specifically.  
[C] On Article 83d of the SCC (IV. Organizational defects of foundations): The Swiss 
Civil Code provides the public authority with the power to intervene and directly restore 
situations where a foundation fails to organize itself pursuant to requirements of the authority. 
Under some circumstances the authority might even dispose of the foundation’s assets, 
assigning them to another foundation of similar purpose. In theory, this is a way to ensure that 
foundations registered with the authority are internally structured pursuant to the law and 
supervisory regulations. But at the same time, such a disposition imposes a more compelling 
level of responsibility on the authority when assessing and endorsing any foundation in its 
registry. This provision does not concern issues of transparency vis-à-vis the public as such. 
However, it is not detrimental either. Conversely, Recommendation 12 expressly addresses 
the issue of sharing information on a foundation’s organization, activities, grant-making 
procedures, and purposes. This provision constitutes a plausible approach aimed at enhancing 
transparency between the foundation and the public, so that in conjunction with the ensemble 
of Recommendations 4 through 15 on Leadership, it provides for a level of transparency.  
                                                          
129 SCC, Article 556 (on Duty to submit the will) mandates that a will be submitted to the public 
authority; the public authority can afterwards release the estate to the statutory heirs on a provisional basis or 
designate an estate administrator.  
130 SCC, Art. 557 II. Reading the will.  
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[D] With regard to the recommendations aimed at providing a framework of rules and 
conditions for the granting of funds, taking into account cost-analysis and the fact that 
foundations are not alone in the sector: Although these recommendations are directed more 
toward implementing a rational management of the foundation’s funds than transparency as 
such, the fact that the SFC recommends that these policies be stipulated in writing provides 
grant-making applicants with a set of instructions drafted ex ante, which should help enhance 
grant permissions and at the same time reduce arbitrary refusals.  
[E] On the finance of grant-making foundations: One of the responsibilities imposed 
on board members is the duty to check the origin of the assets introduced to the foundation. In 
general, the recommendations relating to this duty of care do not deal with issues of 
transparency directly. Nevertheless, they do provide foundations with principled guidelines 
that help the sector to function smoothly.  
[F] On the accounting procedures of foundations: The Swiss Civil Code does not 
provide any rules specifying accounting procedures for foundations. This omission leaves 
numerous options open to the managers who are charged with fulfilling the foundation’s 
purpose. The SCC regulations together with the rules and procedures for extending grants, as 
well as the SCF’s general rules on finance, should help foundations offer a clearer picture of 
their activities. Recommendation 26 of the SFC constitutes a valued tool for achieving this.  
[G] On auditing procedures for foundations: The authority has the power to exempt a 
foundation from the obligation to appoint external auditors. This potentially undermines the 
credibility of the authority in cases where the foundation becomes insolvent. In this sense, the 
Code’s conditions might not always suffice to shield the authority from this risk. To address 
this risk, Sprecher presents a case where a group of foundations could create a foundation 
whose sole purpose would be to independently audit that group of grant-making foundations. 
Provided that the sector has sufficient resources for this purpose, the creation of an 
independent auditing foundation would promote transparency by giving specialists in the 
sector the opportunity to provide clear accounting procedures for foundations. 
[H] On the supervisory authority and the oversight of foundations: Supervision should 
become more coherent throughout Switzerland. A highly confederated country, composed of 
26 independent cantons, can only welcome such a provision. The SFC recommendations on 
the supervision of foundations therefore contribute to the sector’s transparency.  
[I] On insolvent or over-indebted foundations: None of the provisions concerns the 
transparency of grant-making foundations. At the same time, the fact that the law applies 
corporate rules on insolvency and bankruptcy to foundations shields the philanthropic sector 
from being hijacked by spurious financial maneuvers exercised by either local or foreign 
players.  
[J] On bookkeeping: This legal aspect is not directly linked to transparency, but it is 
an instrumental item for achieving high standards in transparency.  
[K] On changes in the foundation’s purpose: In principle, the intervention of the 
public authority in providing clearance for a change in the foundation’s purpose is likely to 
contribute favorably to transparency issues.  
[L] On changes in the foundation’s object at the founder’s request: Whereas the SFC 
is markedly silent on this issue, SCC commentators suggest that the purpose should be 
defined as broadly as possible. However, the public authority has virtually no power to decide 
on the new purpose. Once the conditions required for changing the object have been met, the 
authority can do nothing in order to object. In this sense, the legislature clearly considers the 
legal requirements sufficient to ensure that the system is not abused. While this is possibly a 
disputable approach, the alternative would be to grant the public authority the right to 
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designate a new purpose, which would conflict with the nature of the foundation as a legal, 
liberal institution. Moreover, if the authority does not have the right to determine the 
foundation’s purpose at the moment of its registration, why should it acquire such a right later 
on? 
[M] On the dissolution of foundations and deletion from the register: This provision 
also contributes to the transparency of this sector. It provides the public authority and 
interested parties with the right to request the liquidation of a foundation that has become 
estranged from its initial purpose over time due to changes in the purpose or the deed’s 
restrictions. 
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